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The trafficking of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a continual security 
threat in the Middle East and North Africa. One of the methods for obtaining illicit SALW 
within these two regions is the diversion of licit arms. Trafficked SALW can be used in many 
different types of violence, including non-state actor violence and violence against civilian 
populations. The relationship between legal and illegal SALW can be studied by applying a joint 
commodity framework to legal arms import statistics. Using a quantitative approach, this 
research applies the joint commodity framework to assess the relationship between SALW 
transfers and non-state actor violence and violence against civilians in the Middle East and North 
Africa regions. This study concludes that there is a relationship between non-state actor violence 
and legal SALW imports within the Middle East and North Africa. Conversely, this study also 
concludes that there is not a relationship between violence against civilians and legal SALW 
imports within the two regions. Overall, this study demonstrates that the joint commodity 
framework serves as an accurate model to assess the relationship between licit arms transfers and 
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The phenomenon of illicit arms trafficking continues to serve as a global issue that causes 
adverse consequences in regions around the world. It serves as a threat to the stability of 
governments worldwide and remains a security concern across regions. The trafficking of small 
arms and light weapons is a specific threat that differs from the cumulative phenomenon of arms 
trafficking. The differentiating factor in the trafficking of small arms and light weapons is their 
portability and transferability. Whereas major weapon systems are likely to stay in one location 
or general area, two parties can easily transfer small arms and light weapons in a simple 
exchange. Additionally, if left unattended, other parties can quickly take small arms and light 
weapons for their use. Concealment also plays a significant role in the continuing issue of small 
arms and light weapons trafficking. Major weapons, if stolen or achieved through illicit means, 
are more difficult to conceal. Even if larger weapons are mobile, it takes time to move and is 
much easier to detect. Small arms and light weapons are entirely different in this aspect. Indeed, 
once obtained, they can be easily concealed in various manners including on one’s person; 
within a mode of transportation, such as a car; or hidden in a discreet location for later retrieval 
and use.  
 Illicit small arms and light weapons are used by many parties, including governments, 
non-state actors, or a country’s civilian population. The parties who obtain small arms and light 
weapons serve as a threat to government stability within the respective region and the safety of 
the nearby civilian population. As noted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
“illicit firearms are present in most forms of violent crimes and increase the power of organized 
criminal groups.”1 Regardless of who obtains these weapons, if they are not the intended 
                                                 





recipient, they are a security concern. The security concern of small arms and light weapons 
continues even if there is no malicious intent behind their acquisition. If weapons are obtained 
illegally, the group that holds them is not the intended end recipient. Illegal weapons acquisition 
constitutes a threat, regardless of the intent behind their procurement. Illicit arms trafficking is 
also an issue that coincides with other transnational criminal activities, including drug 
trafficking.2 As these transitional activities continue and feed off one another, the regional and 
global security implications increase. Thus, while arms trafficking appears to be an independent 
phenomenon, it is closely tied with other criminal activities and destabilizing operations in 
regions worldwide.  
 The illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons is a consistent problem in many 
regions, but it remains a particular problem within the Middle East and North Africa. In these 
two regions, transnational terrorists and non-state actors work across borders to achieve 
overarching objectives.3 The areas also contain governments that are at war or facing domestic 
insurgencies within their own borders.4 Due to these contributing factors, the Middle East and 
North Africa regions are a haven for small arms and light weapons trafficking. Whether the legal 
arms are lost, traded by corrupt officials, abandoned, or obtained through violent means, licit 
arms are continually being transformed into illicit weapons and ending up in the possession of 
other parties. The dominance of illicit arms trafficking within the Middle East and North Africa 
continues to have a destabilizing effect on the two regions and the security of the populations 
                                                 
2 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Links Between Illicit Drug Trafficking and Illicit Firearms 
Trafficking,” Resolution 51/11, 2009, 2. 
3 Clayton Thomas, Jeremy M. Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard, and Christina L. Arabia. Arms Sales in the Middle 
East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
November 23, 2020. 1. 





within its borders. Due to the strong presence of illicit arms trafficking within these two regions, 
this study will focus on the Middle East and North Africa.  
In addition to the security threat posed by the illicit trafficking of small arms and light 
weapons in the Middle East and North Africa, the elusive nature of illicit weapons makes the 
issue difficult to track and address. Much like other illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, 
traditional arms trafficking methods have utilized seizure information as the key focus in 
addressing the issue and creating a path forward. However, the use of seizure data addresses the 
problem after the illicit activity has already occurred. Illegal arms seizure data can outline 
trafficking patterns, but it does not directly address the issue. A new form of analysis is needed 
to combat the subject of illegal arms trafficking. This study will test a unique point of statistical 
analysis: legal arms transfers. In doing so, it will also consider the relationship outside actor 
violence. This study will center around one question: How do legal arms transfers affect non-
state actor violence and one-sided violence against civilians within the Middle East and 
North Africa?  This study will explore the possibilities of legal arms assessment in the Middle 




The following is a review of current and recent academic literature related to licit and 
illicit arms transfers. While the existing scholarship provides an overview of subjects that touch 
upon the research question in this study, there is no research that addresses the issue in a similar 
manner. Existing research is helpful in understanding the phenomenon of illicit arms trafficking, 





Measuring Arms Trafficking 
While arms trafficking seizure data is difficult to obtain, academic literature has 
attempted to subvert this obstacle through the quantitative and qualitative measurement of 
statistics related to the illicit arms trade. Additionally, previous scholarship has created 
frameworks and assessment tools for future measuring of arms trafficking. As described by 
Nowak and Carlson, the numerous sources of arms trafficking make illicit arms flows difficult to 
measure.5 While arms trafficking statistics are difficult to acquire, several works have utilized 
other statistics in place of specific arms trafficking statistics. Carlson, for example, utilized 
weapons seizure data and illegal firearm market prices to calculate the illicit arms in Somalia.6 
Similarly, Nowak examined illicit arms prices data, arms seizure data, and firearms homicides 
within Honduras.7  
Additional statistics are also evident in the work of Marsh, who utilized press reports and 
UN Security Council statistics to outline the seizure of illicit weapons from Libya, Algeria, 
Egypt, Chad, Sudan, and Tunisia.8 De Tessières also uses data on the arms seizures by the 
Nigerien armed forces and gendarmerie and interviews about the prices of arms and ammunition. 
De Tessières also utilized reported armed robbery statistics in her measurement of illicit arms in 
Niger.9 As the above research demonstrates, the seizure information for certain countries is made 
available by the government. However, it is important to note that seizure statistics are not 
                                                 
5 Matthias Nowak, “Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Honduras”. Small Arms Survey Research Notes no. 62 
(November 2016), 2; and Khristopher Carlson, “Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia”. Small Arms Survey 
Research Notes no. 61 (October 1, 2016). 2. 
6 Khristopher Carlson, “Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia”. Small Arms Survey Research Notes no. 61 
(October 1, 2016). 2-3. 
7 Matthias Nowak, “Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Honduras”. Small Arms Survey Research Notes no. 62 
(November 2016). 2-3.  
8 Nicholas Marsh. "Brothers came back with weapons: the effects of arms proliferation from Libya." Prism 6, no. 4 
(2017): 81. 






widely available for most countries. Additionally, the lack of a centralized seizure database 
contributes to the lack of information.  
Additional research has attempted to create a firearms tracing framework to measure 
illicit firearms trafficking. A key framework is in the work of Ivanova in which arms exports and 
imports served as a measurement of small arms and light weapons transfers.10 While the 
framework Ivanova identified is theoretical, it outlines the potential measurement of legal arms 
and illegal arms as joint goods and the use of official arms transactions as the basis for illegal 
arms transfers.11  
 
Legality of Arms Trafficking 
Within the academic literature dedicated to arms trafficking, scholars have addressed the 
criminality and legal constructs of the phenomenon. Additionally, Rothe and Collins note that 
“the broader small arms market should be considered as a system that facilitates criminogenic 
conditions and small arms trafficking.”12 Within the concept of system criminality, arms 
trafficking is displayed on a continuum to reflect the varying transactions and actors that 
contribute to the holistic criminal nature of the arms trafficking phenomenon.13 As noted by 
Rothe and Collins, “the line between legal and illegal, intended destination, intermediary 
locations, final destination, involvement of transnational networks, corporations and states 
reveals a complex system of actors and actions.”14 The authors argue that system criminality can 
                                                 
10 Kate Ivanova and Anna Ivanova. “An Analysis of Illicit Arms Trade”. APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. 
(2009). 15.   
11 Ibid, 4. 
12  Dawn L. Rothe and Victoria Collins. “An Exploration of Applying System Criminality to Arms Trafficking.” 
International Criminal Justice Review 21, no. 1 (March 2011): 23.  
13 Ibid, 24.  





be applied to arms trafficking to address the phenomenon under international law.15 In 
addressing the limitations of international law in combating arms trafficking, Rothe and Ross 
discuss the need to hold multiple actors accountable for actions of arms trafficking.16 When 
describing a change in the legal applications of arms trafficking, Rothe and Ross conclude that 
several actors, including the source countries and diversion countries, should hold legal 
responsibility for the eventual trafficking of arms and the actions committed with the trafficked 
arms.17 In another piece of scholarship, Rothe and Ross argue this point further by extending the 
complicity of source and diversion states in the arms trafficking process.18 This literature 
addresses important points about the roles that legal arms transfers play in the arms trafficking 
process.   
 
Preventing Arms Trafficking  
There are numerous pieces of academic scholarship dedicated to the study of the 
prevention of arms trafficking. The academic literature is devoted to several topics within the 
prevention subject, including recent coordination efforts, public and private networks, regional 
policies, uniformity in enforcement, and state responsibility. Greene discusses recent 
coordination efforts, including legal arms transfer regulation, arms brokering, marking and 
tracing of firearms, stockpile management and destruction, and arms collection from civilians.19 
Additional topics addressed by Greene demonstrate the difficulties in coordination between 
                                                 
15 Ibid, 26.  
16 Dawn L. Rothe and Jeffrey Ian Ross. "How States Facilitate Small Arms Trafficking in Africa: A Theoretical and 
Juristic Interpretation." African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies 5, no. 1 (2012): 11. 
17 Ibid, 11. 
18 Dawn L. Rothe and Jeffrey Ian Ross. "The State and Transnational Organized Crime. The Case of Small Arms 
Trafficking." Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime, London: Routledge (2011): 399. 
19 Owen Greene. “Examining International Responses to Illicit Arms Trafficking”. Crime, Law and Social Change 





regional, state, and international entities.20 Additionally, in the work of Snyder, the author 
identifies the lack of uniformity in national laws across the international community.21 In his 
work, Snyder identifies a crucial and debated topic in the academic literature that while one state 
may have compliance or ends-laws and strict enforcement, another country may not have any of 
these mechanisms in place to stifle the arms trafficking process.22 In response to the difficulties 
of coordination, additional authors provide recommendations. Whereas some authors, such as 
Greene, offer an international solution to the problem, including an international action program, 
others such as Bolton et al. and Berman focus on the coordinated regional and local efforts to 
combat illicit arms trafficking.23 Bolton, et al. further argue the key role that overlapping 
initiatives and programs play in preventing illicit arms trafficking.24 Berman also addresses the 
value of regional policies and frameworks that are more stringent than the UN’s requirements for 
managing the control of small arms and diversion to illicit actors.25 Additional work, such as 
Gildea and Pierce’s literature, creates an assessment framework to analyze the effectiveness of a 
country’s small arms export control mechanisms.26 Lastly, under the arms trafficking prevention 
scholarship, there is literature that addresses various stakeholders’ complicity in the arms 
trafficking cycle. Whereas Rothe and Ross discuss the complicity of all actors involved, not 
                                                 
20 Ibid, 152. 
21 Neil N. Snyder. “Disrupting Illicit Small Arms Trafficking the Middle East” (Thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2008). 17.  
22 Ibid, 17.  
23 Greene. “Examining International Responses to Illicit Arms Trafficking”. 186; Matthew Bolton, Eiko Elize 
Sakamoto, and Hugh Griffiths. "Globalization and the Kalashnikov: Public–Private Networks in the Trafficking and 
Control of Small Arms." Global Policy 3, no. 3 (2012): 8; Eric G. Berman. Beyond Blue Helmets: Promoting 
Weapons and Ammunition Management in Non-UN Peace Operations. Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 
March 2019. 52. 
24 Bolton, et al. "Globalization and the Kalashnikov: Public–Private Networks in the Trafficking and Control of 
Small Arms."  8. 
25 Berman. Beyond Blue Helmets: Promoting Weapons and Ammunition Management in Non-UN Peace Operations. 
52.  
26 Timothy Gildea and Glenn Pierce. "Small Arms and Light Weapons Trafficking: Creating an Assessment 





solely heads of state, Bolton, et al. address the phenomenon of arms trafficking from the 
standpoint of the varying public and private networks involved.27 As noted by Berman and 
Muggah, small arms proliferation is not solely a supply-based phenomenon.28 Both demand and 
supply are key factors in the arms trafficking process.  
 
Logistics of Arms Trafficking 
Academic scholarship has also dedicated works to explain the logistics of illegal arms 
trafficking, which serves as a critical piece of the illicit arms phenomenon. Some scholarship 
centers around trafficking methods, whereas others focus on specific cases of arms trafficking 
and common trafficking routes. Overall, the existing academic literature indicates that there are 
many ways and methods in which small arms and light weapons can be diverted and illegally 
obtained. In an article by Thachuk and Saunders, the authors address both the airborne method of 
arms transfers and the specific trafficking route from former Soviet states through the United 
Arab Emirates to Africa.29 Thachuk and Saunders also note that the logistics of airborne arms 
trafficking is similar to the supply chain of a licit business in that the appropriate skills and 
global business understanding are necessary.30 Marsh describes the role that porous borders and 
poor stockpile management played in the aftermath of the Libyan civil war.31 Marsh also 
describes the specific illicit arms movement from Libya to Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Tunisia, and 
                                                 
27 Bolton, et al. "Globalization and the Kalashnikov: Public–Private Networks in the Trafficking and Control of 
Small Arms." 1; Rothe, Ross. "The State and Transnational Organized Crime. The Case of Small Arms 
Trafficking."  399-400. 
28 Robert Muggah and Eric Berman. Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons. Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, July 2001. XI.  
29 Kimberley Thachuk and Karen Saunders, “Under the Radar: Airborne Arms Trafficking Operations in 
Africa”. European Journal on Criminal Policy & Research 20 (2014): 361–362  
30 Ibid, 362   






Sudan.32 Jenzen-Jones and McCollum also describe the outflow of illicit arms from Libya via 
online arms markets.33 
Additional literature is devoted to the common elements that contribute to illicit arms 
trafficking. As further described by Stohl, small arms trafficking centers around legitimate 
international channels, systems, and infrastructures, as well as newly-developed illicit 
networks.34 Stohl describes seven ways in which the diversion of licit arms can occur. These 
methods include shipping legal weapons to barred countries, directly or indirectly, poor stockpile 
management, looting of national arsenals, lost weapons, soldiers selling weapons for cash, 
weapons stolen from civilian owners, and the facilitation of small arms to the illicit market 
through domestic purchasing laws.35 Berman provides a further breakdown of the specific 
situations that can lead to diversion and loss of arms within peacekeeping missions, including 
attacks on fixed sites, attacks on patrols, and attacks on convoys and troop movements.36 
Additional causes of diversion listed include burglary and robbery, airdrops, forced 
abandonment, and corruption.37  
As noted by Snyder, the global legal production of weapons is highly relevant to the 
illicit arms trade.38 Snyder also notes that “at virtually any point in the supply chain, a legally 
produced weapon can become ‘gray’ or ‘black: through theft, fraudulent sale, or transfer through 
or to inappropriate actors.”39 As noted by Rothe and Ross, the “line between legal and illegal, 
                                                 
32 Ibid, 80. 
33 N.R. Jenzen-Jones and Ian McCollum. Web Trafficking: Analyzing the Online Trade of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in Libya. Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, April 2017. 26.  
34 Rachel Stohl. The Tangled Web of Illicit Arms Trafficking. Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 
October 12, 2004. 21.  
35 Ibid, 22.  
36 Eric G. Berman. Beyond Blue Helmets: Promoting Weapons and Ammunition Management in Non-UN Peace 
Operations. Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, March 2019. 35-36.  
37 Ibid. 39-41.  
38 Snyder. “Disrupting Illicit Small Arms Trafficking the Middle East”. 20.  





‘intended’ destination, intermediary locations, and states reveals a complex system of actors and 
actions.40 The fine line between legal and illegal is a key element to the scholarship on illicit 
arms trafficking. 
 
Economics of Arms Trafficking 
Academic scholarship also discusses the attributes of arms trafficking compared to the 
economics of a licit business. Arsovska and Kostakos discuss the arc of supply and demand in 
the Balkans, concluding that traditional economic market forces play a significant role in the 
illicit arms trafficking market.41 Demand for illegal arms can derive from a variety of factors, 
including inequality, urban crime, and an increased desire for self-protection.42 Additionally, the 
literature supports the close relationship between licit arms supply and illicit arms demand. As 
described by Berman and Muggah, “it also appears that domestic supply is in some cases feeding 
demand.”43 Snyder also notes that the international small arms trade has benefitted from 
globalization and increased economic interdependence in the same manner as other international 
businesses.44 Globalization further encourages the sale and delivery of weapons worldwide due 
to the reduced restrictions on the movement of goods.45 Snyder’s work also highlights the role 
that supply and demand play in the illegal arms trafficking process, including the establishment 
of small arms prices.46 Moreover, as supply and demand for licit and illicit small arms and light 
                                                 
40 Rothe, Ross. "How States Facilitate Small Arms Trafficking in Africa: A Theoretical and Juristic Interpretation." 
2. 
41 Jana Arsovska and Panos A. Kostakos. "Illicit Arms Trafficking and the Limits of Rational Choice Theory: The 
Case of the Balkans." Trends in Organized Crime 11, no. 4 (2008): 369-370. 
42 Muggah and Berman. Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. 10. 
43 Ibid, 10. 
44 Snyder. “Disrupting Illicit Small Arms Trafficking the Middle East”. 21.  
45 Ibid, 21-22.  





weapons changes, so does the prices that are associated with the weapons. Brauer and Muggah 
also provide insight into the demand for small arms by characterizing demand for small arms as a 
function of means and motivation.47 Overall, the illicit arms market demonstrates similar traits to 
the economic models for licit business. While this is inherent in the fact that illegal arms are 
commodities just like legal arms, it also indicates the means and motivation of outside 
individuals in obtaining these arms.  
 
Arms Trafficking and Non-State Actors 
Academic scholarship has also devoted literature to the use of illicit small arms and light 
weapons by non-state actors. The history of the issue is highlighted by work of Enomoto, which 
notes the precedent for arms transfers by and transfers to “individuals and groups other than the 
ruling authority.”48 A portion of this scholarship is devoted to describing certain non-state 
organizations or regions. As noted by Clarke, illicit arms are used to further the violent activities 
of many groups, including the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State.49 Non-state actors obtain 
illicit arms through various mechanisms, including theft, corruption, and the raiding of 
stockpiles. Both Demuynck and Clarke discuss the raiding of stockpiles in North Africa, Iraq, 
and Syria.50  
                                                 
47 Jurgen Brauer and Robert Muggah, “Completing the Circle: Building a Theory of Small Arms Demand,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 27, no. 1 (2006): 140. 
48 Tamara Enomoto. "Controlling Arms Transfers to Non-state Actors: From the Emergence of the Sovereign-State 
System to the Present." History of Global Arms Transfer, 3 (2017): 3. 
49 Colin P. Clarke. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Trafficking, Smuggling, and Use for Criminality by Terrorists 
and Insurgents: A Brief Historical Overview. The Hague, Netherlands: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2020. 
11.  
50 Meryl Demuynck, Tanya Mehra, and Reinier Bergema. ICCT Situation Report: The Use of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons by Terrorist Organizations as a Source of Finance in the Middle East and North Africa. The Hague, 
Netherlands: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. May 2020. 10.; Colin P. Clarke. Small Arms and Light 






Overall, the academic literature highlights the importance of networks in the use of illicit 
arms by non-state actor groups. Clarke discusses the importance of networks to both al-Qaeda 
and the Islamic State. the Islamic State maintained a diversified weapons network and series of 
contacts, including other insurgent groups and corrupt members of security forces.51 Conversely, 
Al-Qaeda’s use of illicit weapons came about as the group established networks across the 
Middle East and Southeast Asia, leading to an influx of small arms and light weapons through 
illicit networks.52 
Demuynck et al. provide a different perspective regarding the value of trafficked arms to 
non-state actors.53 Demuynck et al. note that due to the durability and dual-purpose use of small 
arms and light weapons, they contain a high strategic value for non-state actors and terrorist 
organizations.54 Small arms and light weapons are used to carry out attacks, establish control 
over territory, obtain financing, and conduct other illegal activities in support of the group.55 
Clarke also demonstrates that terrorist and insurgent groups have consistently utilized the illicit 
trade of small arms and light weapons to satisfy their demand for weapons.56 Even in post-
conflict settings where disarmament or reintegration occur, non-state actors horde weapons for 
future peacetime and conflict use.57 In turn, those weapons become a key piece in the cycle of 
violence committed by historical and contemporary non-state actors. Demuynck et. al summarize 
this by noting that the longstanding presence of terrorist organizations in the Middle East and 
                                                 
51 Ibid, 12.  
52 Ibid, 12.  
53 Demuynck, et al. ICCT Situation Report: The Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Terrorist Organizations 
as a Source of Finance in the Middle East and North Africa. 2.  
54 Ibid, 2.  
55 Ibid, 2. 
56 Colin P. Clarke. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Trafficking, Smuggling, and Use for Criminality by Terrorists 
and Insurgents: A Brief Historical Overview. 12.  





North Africa has contributed significantly to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons 
within the region.58 
Additional academic scholarship is devoted to the intersection between small arms and 
light weapons trafficking, terrorism, and crime. As described in the works of Cheema and 
Clarke, this connection references the crime-terror nexus. The works of both Clarke and Cheema 
discuss the role that the crime-terror nexus plays in the instability of a state.59 Cheema further 
notes the threat that arms trafficking and improper deterrence can play in threatening the security 
of the state.60 Additionally, the literature notes that ineffective counterterrorism policies, 
inadequate military and search operations, and lack of change in weapons acquisition processes 
have only exacerbated this problem.61 Cheema notes that the spread of small arms as a tool of 
violence ultimately leads to society’s socio-economic and security deterioration.62 As non-state 
actors’ capabilities and arms holdings grow, their operations within the crime-terror nexus only 
increase.63 When the accessibility of small arms becomes an apparatus of force against a 
country’s citizens and institutions, it is a threat to human security.64 Clarke also makes an 
important point regarding the role of small arms trafficking in contributing to low-intensity 
conflicts, including conflicts with non-state actors.65 This is a key concept that will be tested and 
highlighted within this research study.    
                                                 
58 Demuynck, et al. ICCT Situation Report: The Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Terrorist Organizations 
as a Source of Finance in the Middle East and North Africa. 12.  
59 Ryan Clarke. Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia: States, Security and Non-State Actors. (Hoboken: Taylor & 
Francis, 2011), 78-79; Raheela Asfa Cheema. "Small Arms Trafficking and Crime-Terror Nexus." Defence 
Journal 17, no. 7 (2014): 46. 
60 Raheela Asfa Cheema. "Small Arms Trafficking and Crime-Terror Nexus." Defence Journal 17, no. 7 (2014): 51. 
61 Ibid, 51. 
62 Ibid, 51. 
63 Ibid, 51. 
64 Ibid, 52. 
65 Ryan Clarke, Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia: States, Security and Non-State Actors. (Hoboken: Taylor & 







Discussion of the Literature 
 
Overall, the academic literature on the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons 
addresses the phenomenon as it currently exists. The prevention of arms trafficking is dominant 
in the literature. A variety of scholars attempt to provide frameworks and case studies for the 
future reduction or elimination of arms trafficking within the global community. Additionally, 
the prevention literature utilizes historical examples to provide additional context and 
recommendations. The logistics of arms trafficking is also dominant within the academic 
literature. Legal small arms and light weapons can be transformed into illicit weapons in many 
different ways. The literature also includes historical examples of legal arms diversion for illicit 
activities and the theoretical overview of the phenomenon and its causes. A crucial point within 
the logistics literature is the almost instantaneous transformation of a legal weapon into an illicit 
one. This transformation is a key cornerstone of this study. This concept also aligns with the 
literature on the legality of arms trafficking. The legal literature highlights the central functions 
that responsibility and motivation play in the arms trafficking process. The legal scholarship also 
highlights the role of the rational choice theory in calculating the potential gains that can come 
from violating criminal laws through arms trafficking. The literature devoted to the economic 
aspects of arms trafficking addresses supply, demand, and the role of globalization in the 
trafficking of small arms and light weapons. The economic literature is consistent with the theory 
that there is a strong similarity between licit arms markets and illicit arms markets.  
Academic literature also demonstrates a clear tie between illicit arms and non-state 
actors. While the literature does not attempt to measure the relationship between the two, it 
points to key relationships between illicit small arms and light weapons and non-state actor 





seizures is a critical category of literature in relation to this study. The literature outlines several 
abstract frameworks and theoretical variables that can measure the phenomenon of small arms 
trafficking. While these frameworks and variables are helpful in understanding the phenomenon, 
they cannot be easily tested due to the lack of arms trafficking statistical data. One critical 
statistical benchmark for arms trafficking, arms seizure data, is rarely available to the public. In 
the literature that does perform statistical analysis, there are only small samples of seizure and 
illicit arms data on which the hypotheses and overall literature are based. This study will address 
a missing piece in the measurement literature and build upon a key concept outlined by Ivanova: 
the analysis of licit weapons and illicit weapons as interchangeable joint commodities.66 The 
academic literature noted several times the fine line between a weapon being legal or illegal. 
This study will take this concept one step further by considering both legal and illegal weapons 
as interchangeable. It will also address a second topic on which the academic literature is sparse: 
comparing the relationship between specific acts of non-state actor violence and legal arms 
imports. This concept will also be extended to address the relationship between attacks on 
civilians and legal arms imports.  
 
Hypotheses 
This research study aims to test the relationships between legal arms transfers, non-state 
actor violence, and one-sided violence against civilians. To accomplish this goal, this study will 
explore several critical concepts that have been conceptualized in academic literature but not 
previously tested. The idea of licit and illicit arms as joint commodities is the key framework 
behind this study. As reflected in the academic scholarship, the difference between legal and 
                                                 
66 Kate Ivanova and Anna Ivanova. “An Analysis of Illicit Arms Trade”. APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. 





illegal arms can alter instantaneously with a change of possession or mode of transportation. As 
joint commodities with ease of movement, small arms and light weapons are especially 
susceptible to this sudden change in legal status. With the change in legal status comes a possible 
change of ownership, location, and use. While the distinction between licit and illicit arms is 
essential when addressing the legality and criminality of their use, this study will treat them as 
joint artifacts. The interchangeability of small arms and light weapons is a key concept that will 
serve as a major cornerstone of this research study.  
Additionally, as noted in the academic literature, illicit small arms and light weapons are 
prevalent in the violent actions of non-state actors and parties against civilians. While academic 
literature addresses the fine line between licit and illicit arms and the role that illicit arms play in 
violence against civilians and non-state actor violence, the existing scholarship does not connect 
these two concepts. Up until this point, these two concepts have been separated into different 
categories of scholarship with no comparison or overlap. This study will join these two ideas 
together to consider the relationship between legal arms and violent acts by non-government 
groups. This study will also analyze the actions of non-state actor violence and violence against 
civilians using small arms and light weapons as joint commodities.  
 In addition to joining two conceptual frameworks, this study also will test a regional 
application of this concept to illustrate possible connections. The regional application of the joint 
commodity model is critical because it distinguishes the concepts that can be applied within real-
world cases. It is not solely a theoretical framework with no application basis. For the application 
of a real-world exemplar, the Middle East and North Africa will be tested. The Middle East and 
North Africa hold combinations of illicit arms, non-state actor violence, violence against 





study. While this study focuses on these two regions, the concepts developed within this research 
hold the potential application for countries and regions around the globe.  
 This study will utilize the concepts above to test two series of hypotheses. The first set of 
hypotheses will contain an independent variable of small arms and light weapons imports within 
the Middle East and North Africa and a dependent variable of non-state actor violence within the 
two regions. The first set of hypotheses is listed below: 
H0: There is no relationship between small arms and light weapons transfers to the 
Middle East and North Africa and non-state actor violence within the two regions. 
 
H1: There is a relationship between small arms and light weapons transfers to the 
Middle East and North Africa and non-state actor violence within the two regions. 
 
The second set of hypotheses will contain an independent variable of small arms and light 
weapons transfers within the Middle East and North Africa and a dependent variable of one-
sided violence against civilians within the two regions. The hypotheses below will be used to test 
these two variables: 
H2: There is no relationship between small arms and light weapons transfers to the 
Middle East and North Africa and one-sided violence against civilians within these 
two regions.  
 
H3: There is a relationship between small arms and light weapons transfers to the 
Middle East and North Africa and one-sided violence against civilians within these 
two regions.  
 
These two sets of hypotheses will be employed to test the utility of the joint commodity model 
for small arms and light weapons. This research will also use the joint commodity model to test 





perspective to illegal arms movements that improves on current models in academic scholarship. 
Lastly, this study will test for quantitative connections between non-state actor violence, violence 
against civilians, and illicit arms movements that are not outlined in academic literature.  
 
Methods 
The two sets of hypotheses within this study will utilize the independent and dependent 
variables listed above to test the relationship between legal arms transfers and non-state actor 
violence and violence against civilians. This study will use the arms import data for seven 
countries within the Middle East and North Africa: Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Afghanistan, 
Yemen, and Libya. These seven countries were selected as representative countries for this study 
because they have available arms transfer statistics, non-state actor statistics, and violence 
against civilian population statistics. Additional countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
were considered for this study, but the countries did not contain substantive statistics for the 
independent and dependent variables in this analysis. This study will use data from 2010 to 2019. 
Additional windows of time were considered, but data limitations contributed to the selection of 
the years from 2010 to 2019. Data on small arms and light weapons imports prior to 2010 can be 
incomplete or minimal within the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.  
For the independent variable of small arms and light weapons transfers, this study will 
utilize data from the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA). The statistics 
in this database provide a comprehensive look at the arms exports and imports to countries 
worldwide. To measure the small arms and light weapons trades to a country, the independent 
variable will be measured utilizing the arms import data from the seven countries included in this 





small arms and light weapons imports into each country. The United Nations Register of 
Conventional Arms beaks down small arms and light weapons imports by type. The small arms 
and light weapons utilized in this study from the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms 
are included in the table below: 67  
Figure 1: 
Small Arms Light Weapons 
Revolvers and pistols Heavy machine guns 
Submachine guns Hand-held underbarrel and mounted grenade launchers 
Light machine guns Portable anti-tank guns 
Rifles and carbines Recoilless rifles 
Assault rifles Portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems 
Other small arms Mortars of calibers less than 75mm 
 Other light weapons 
           
 
The UN Register of Conventional Arms includes all imports reported by UN member states. 
Member states are required to report all small arms and light weapons that are imported into their 
territory.68 This database includes all imports from government and private sector actors. The 
import statistic for each type of weapon and each country will be totaled together to create a 
small arms and light weapons composite for each year. These yearly composite numbers will 
serve as the independent variable.  
 This study will draw from data in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Database to calculate the two dependent variables. 
For the non-state actor violence dependent variable, the UCDP/PRIO Non-State Conflict Dataset 
will serve as the data source. For the purposes of the dataset, UCDP/PRIO describes non-state 
                                                 
67 “United Nations Register of Conventional Arms”. United Nations. 





actor conflict as “communal and organized armed conflict where none of the parties is the 
government of a state.”69 The key statistic within this dataset will be the “Best Fatality Estimate” 
variable. The “Best Fatality Estimate” statistics from the seven countries from 2010 to 2019 will 
be compiled to create a yearly total for each individual country. The countries will then be added 
together to create a yearly composite number. For the violence against civilians dependent 
variable, the UCDP/PRIO One-sided Violence dataset will be used. The “Best Fatality Estimate” 
statistic within this dataset will be compiled together in an identical way to the statistic in the 
first dataset. Within this dataset, one-sided violence is described as “intentional attacks on 
civilians by governments and formally organized armed groups”.70 The statistics from this 
variable will be added together to create another series of yearly totals. The yearly composite for 
each of the dependent variables will be matched to the corresponding yearly independent 
variable composites. While the “Best Fatality Estimate” will be used as the key statistic for both 
dependent variables, the statistic for each will come from two different UCDP datasets.  
 Two key statistical tests will be conducted utilizing the variables above to test the two 
sets of hypotheses. The first test is the Pearson correlation coefficient test. This test will be used 
to determine if there is any statistical relationship between small arms and light weapons 
transfers and non-state actor violence and small arms and light weapons transfers and violence 
against civilians. This test will also evaluate whether there is a strong or weak or positive or 
negative relationship between the two sets of variables. If the test indicates a correlation 
coefficient close to 0, this will indicate a weak correlation between the independent variable and 
the two dependent variables. If the correlation coefficient is closer to 1, this will indicate a 
stronger correlation between the independent and dependent variables.  
                                                 
69 “UCDP Dataset Download Center”. Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute, Oslo. n.d. 





The second statistical test included in this study is the p-value test. This test will 
determine if there is a statistically significant relationship between small arms and light weapons 
transfers and non-state actor violence, and small arms and light weapons transfers and violence 
against civilians. The p-value test will use an alpha of .05. The Pearson correlation coefficient 
will indicate any correlation between the two variables. The p-value test will determine if there is 
a statistically significant basis for causation between the independent and dependent variables. If 
the p-value is less than .05, this will confirm a statistically significant relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. It will also indicate the need to reject the null hypothesis. 
If the p-value is greater than .05, this will indicate that there is not a statistically significant 
relationship between the two variables. It will also indicate that we should accept the null 
hypothesis.  
In addition to the Pearson and p-value tests performed on the seven countries as a group, 
this study will also include tests on each individual country. These tests will provide further 
insight into the relationship between the independent and dependent variables in each country. 
This study will provide a holistic look at the relationship between the variables within the Middle 
East and North Africa region and the relationships between the two sets of variables within each 
country. While the hypotheses in this research study are solely centered around the cumulative 
totals from all seven countries, the individual breakdown of each country will provide additional 










The data utilized in this study is included below:  
 
Figure 2:  
Country Year SALW Imports Non-State Actors Fatalities Attacks on Civilians Fatalities 
Afghanistan 2010 17,512 99 185 
Afghanistan 2011 22,972 25 76 
Afghanistan 2012 9,075 0 83 
Afghanistan 2013 7,714 0 64 
Afghanistan 2014 4,978 0 240 
Afghanistan 2015 5,286 532 161 
Afghanistan 2016 3,426 365 0 
Afghanistan 2017 31,934 72 96 
Afghanistan 2018 13,870 631 122 
Afghanistan 2019 3,823 51 195 
Iraq 2010 7,961 0 706 
Iraq 2011 39,526 0 322 
Iraq 2012 20,012 0 769 
Iraq 2013 38,965 0 0 
Iraq 2014 126,631 64 0 
Iraq 2015 14,699 26 56 
Iraq 2016 30,413 0 114 
Iraq 2017 55,411 0 102 
Iraq 2018 37,331 0 0 
Iraq 2019 3 0 0 
Lebanon 2010 797 0 0 
Lebanon 2011 16 0 0 
Lebanon 2012 23 52 0 
Lebanon 2013 4,871 127 47 
Lebanon 2014 11,643 82 0 
Lebanon 2015 106 121 0 
Lebanon 2016 1,371 0 0 
Lebanon 2017 6,768 223 0 
Lebanon 2018 2,509 0 0 
Lebanon 2019 269 0 0 
Egypt 2010 528 0 0 
Egypt 2011 19 31 0 
Egypt 2012 6,844 74 0 
Egypt 2013 57,445 119 0 
Egypt 2014 77,127 28 0 
Egypt 2015 1,718 0 0 
Egypt 2016 642 0 0 
Egypt 2017 5,652 0 0 





Egypt 2019 626 0 0 
Sudan 2010 0 625 41 
Sudan 2011 0 255 155 
Sudan 2012 22,109 58 0 
Sudan 2013 0 1,291 0 
Sudan 2014 0 959 94 
Sudan 2015 0 898 371 
Sudan 2016 0 180 448 
Sudan 2017 672 262 65 
Sudan 2018 1,816 100 75 
Sudan 2019 1,550 112 188 
Yemen 2010 42,610 26 0 
Yemen 2011 0 0 142 
Yemen 2012 80 0 0 
Yemen 2013 645 0 0 
Yemen 2014 4 460 0 
Yemen 2015 20 374 0 
Yemen 2016 10 1,001 0 
Yemen 2017 0 402 0 
Yemen 2018 0 322 0 
Yemen 2019 0 234 0 
Libya 2010 1 0 0 
Libya 2011 0 0 152 
Libya 2012 9,060 377 0 
Libya 2013 77,674 0 0 
Libya 2014 0 1,165 0 
Libya 2015 30 1,105 0 
Libya 2016 0 582 0 
Libya 2017 0 686 0 
Libya 2018 0 614 0 



















The final statistical data is included below: 
 
Figure 3: 
 Pearson p-value 
Cumulative   
SALW Imports & Non-state Actor 
Violence  -0.258 0.031 
SALW Imports & One-Sided Violence 
Against Civilians  -0.00783 0.949 
Afghanistan   
SALW Imports & Non-state Actor 
Violence -0.1846 0.61 
SALW Imports & One-Sided Violence 
Against Civilians -0.15389 0.617 
Iraq   
SALW Imports & Non-state Actor 
Violence 0.765 0.0099 
SALW Imports & One-Sided Violence 
Against Civilians -0.34768 0.3249 
Lebanon   
SALW Imports & Non-state Actor 
Violence 0.51727 0.1257 
SALW Imports & One-Sided Violence 
Against Civilians 0.1855 0.6078 
Egypt   
SALW Imports & Non-state Actor 
Violence 0.55195 0.09808 
SALW Imports & One-Sided Violence 
Against Civilians N/A N/A 
Sudan   
SALW Imports & Non-state Actor 
Violence -0.3896 0.2657 
SALW Imports & One-Sided Violence 
Against Civilians -0.3458795 0.3276 
Yemen   
SALW Imports & Non-state Actor 
Violence -0.2933 0.4108 
SALW Imports & One-Sided Violence 
Against Civilians -0.1133 0.7553 
Libya   
SALW Imports & Non-state Actor 
Violence -0.3849 0.2721 
SALW Imports & One-Sided Violence 








Discussion of Results 
Cumulative Country Results 
 The statistical analysis conducted within this study indicates several different trends 
within the data. The first significant trend is within the test results for the cumulative country 
data. The p-value for small arms and light weapons imports and non-state actor attacks is .031, 
demonstrating a statistically significant relationship between these two variables. The p-value for 
small arms and light weapons imports and attacks on civilians is .949, indicating that there is not 
a statistically significant relationship between these two variables. These two p-value results are 
key as they relate to the two sets of hypotheses within this research. Additionally, the Pearson 
correlation tests indicate a correlation coefficient of -.258 for SALW imports and non-state actor 
conflict. This result demonstrates a weak correlation between the two variables. The Pearson 
correlation test for SALW imports and attacks on civilians had an even smaller correlation of -
.00783. This outcome indicates a very weak correlation between the two variables.  
 
Individual Country Results 
Aside from the cumulative statistics of the seven countries, this study includes a 
statistical analysis for each country to assess the relationship between the variables for that 
specific country. Overall, the p-values for Afghanistan, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, and 
Libya did not indicate a statistically significant relationship between SALW imports and non-
state actor attacks within each respective country. The one country that differs in this respect is 
Iraq. The p-value test for Iraq demonstrated a p-value of .0099. This result indicates that there is 






In the Pearson tests for each country, the results indicate that the correlation between the 
two variables is prevalent in several of the countries utilized in this study.  




The Pearson test results for Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt indicated .765, .517, and.552, 
respectively. These results demonstrate a correlation between SALW transfers and non-state 
actor attacks within these three states. The results from Iraq are significant, as they indicate a 
strong correlation between SALW transfers and non-state actor attacks. The additional countries 
of Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen, and Libya indicated Pearson test results of -.185, -.390, -.293, 
and -.3849, respectively. These results confirm that a correlation does not exist between SALW 

















Pearson Correlation between Small Arms and Light 





The p-value test results for SALW transfers and attacks on civilians indicate very 
different trends from the p-value results for the non-state actor attacks tests. The p-value for the 
cumulative results indicates no statistically significant relationship between SALW transfers and 
attacks on civilians in the countries overall. The individual country results reflect this as well. 
The results for all seven countries are well over the alpha of .-5, indicating no statistically 
significant relationship between the two variables in each individual country.  
The Pearson results in this study are also distinct from the results for SALW transfers and 
non-state actor attacks. For the cumulative test of all seven countries together, the Pearson results 
indicated an almost nonexistent correlation between SALW transfers and attacks on civilians in 
the seven states overall. Each of the individual states also displayed lower Pearson correlations 





























Figure 5:  
 
Each of the seven countries indicated a test result of a weak correlation between SALW 
transfers and attacks on civilians. The highest correlations came from Iraq and Sudan, which 
were -.348 and -.346, respectively. Even though these numbers were the strongest results, they 
still indicate a weak correlation between the two variables. Egypt was the only country that was 
not tested, as it did not have data on attacks against civilians available. In the data section, the 
Egypt Pearson test results are marked “N/A”.  
 
Test Results Related to Hypotheses 
 Having summarized the Pearson and p-value test results, it is crucial to relate these 
results to the two original sets of hypotheses in this study. The results of the p-value test assist in 
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H0: There is no relationship between small arms and light weapons transfers to the Middle 
East and North Africa and non-state actor violence within the two regions. 
 
H1: There is a relationship between small arms and light weapons transfers to the Middle 
East and North Africa and non-state actor violence within the two regions. 
 
In the first set of hypotheses, the p-value test indicates a result of .031. Compared to the 
alpha of .05, this test result indicates a statistically significant relationship between SALW 
transfers in the Middle East and North Africa and non-state actor violence within the region. 
Based on this assessment, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted. 
In accepting the alternative hypothesis, this study concludes that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between small arms and light weapons transfers and non-state actor violence within 
the Middle East and North Africa.  
 
H2: There is no relationship between small arms and light weapons transfers to the Middle 
East and North Africa and one-sided violence against civilians within these two regions.  
 
H3: There is a relationship between small arms and light weapons transfers to the Middle 
East and North Africa and one-sided violence against civilians within these two regions.  
 
The p-value test results are also important for the testing of the second set of hypotheses, 
which centers around the relationship between small arms and weapons transfers to the Middle 
East and North Africa and one-side violence against civilians within the two regions. The p-
value test indicated a result of .949, which is well above the alpha of .05 utilized in this study. 
Subsequently, this study does not accept the alternative hypothesis and maintains that the null 
hypothesis is correct. As the null hypothesis has been proven correct, it is confirmed there is no 
statistically significant relationship between small arms and light weapons transfers to the 





test results also confirm that there is no statistical significance between the two variables, in 
addition to a weak correlation between the two. 
 
Implications 
 The p-value and Pearson test results hold important implications for the study of illicit 
small arms and light weapons trafficking. As this study builds upon the theory that licit arms and 
illicit arms are interchangeable, the results hold indications for further testing of the joint 
commodity concept. The statistically significant relationship between small arms and light 
weapons transfers and non-state actor attacks provides quantitative proof that legal arms transfers 
can contribute to non-state actor activity. The statistics indicated by this study also provide 
quantitative proof that legal arms and illegal arms can be assessed as joint goods. As quantitative 
tracking of illicit arms is difficult to assess due to the lack of publicly available information, the 
substitution of legal arms can lead to further quantitative study that would have otherwise been 
impossible. The outcome of this study is also telling regarding the relationship between legal 
SALW transfers and non-state actor activity. As previous academic scholarship has established 
the relationship between illicit arms and terrorist and criminal activity, this study provides a basis 
for an established relationship between legal arms transfers and terrorist and criminal activity. 
This research serves as a building block of further study of the intersection between legal arms, 
illegal arms, and non-state actor activity.  
While this test did not indicate a relationship between SALW transfers and attacks on 
civilians, it does not mean that attacks on civilians should be dismissed in other tests or research 
studies.  Attacks on civilians can serve as a useful variable when determining the scope and 





relationship between legal SALW transfers and attacks on civilians may be strong. As 
individuals can use both legal and illegal weapons against civilian populations in a one-sided 
conflict, the dependent variable of attacks on civilians still holds promise for future statistical 
tests. 
While the two sets of hypotheses utilized within this study highlighted seven countries’ 
cumulative results, individual country analysis is also included this study to demonstrate the 
different results between each nation. Additionally, the results for each country create an 
individual picture of the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent 
variables within those respective borders. While the existing academic scholarship indicates 
common themes and phenomena in the use of licit and illicit small arms and light weapons, this 
study indicates that these trends can still differ across countries. The cumulative and individual 
analyses also demonstrate the flexibility and applicability of the tests performed in this study. 
The joint commodity approach to licit and illicit arms can be utilized in several regional and state 
situations. Finally, this research indicates the possibilities for additional dependent variables to 
be analyzed against the small arms and light weapons transfers within a country or region. As 
shown in the aforementioned academic scholarship, many research topics intersect with illicit 
arms trafficking. Scholars can use the work demonstrated in this study to support additional 
research on these topics. When used in quantitative study, the joint commodity model can be 
utilized and altered to suit the research focus of the specific country or region in question. The 
joint commodity concept can also be used within other forms of research, including qualitative 
analysis. 
While not listed in one of the original hypotheses for this study, it is important to note 





attacks and the small arms and light weapons import statistics. This provides further statistical 
relationship between SALW imports and non-state actor attacks. While this relationship could be 
connected to outside factors outside of the variables, the results indicate the importance of 
further testing of this subject. Additionally, while there was not a statistically significant 
relationship between the overall number of attacks on civilians and SALW imports, the 
relationship between the two also deserves further testing.  
It is important to note that there may be additional reasons for the relationship between 
legal small arms and light weapons and non-state actor activity in the seven countries included in 
this study. While this study notes the statistically significant relationship between SALW imports 
and fatalities from non-state actor attacks, the relationship can be attributed to other factors not 
mentioned in this study. Additionally, the countries that demonstrated a strong correlation but 
statistically insignificant relationship between SALW transfers and non-state actor violence may 
represent a spurious correlation. The possibilities of additional factors outline the need for further 
research. Additionally, the limitations of the definitions of violence within this study must be 
acknowledged. This study centers around a narrow classification of violence within the Middle 
East and North Africa. While definitions of non-state actor violence and violence against 
civilians from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute, Oslo database, the 
definitions utilized are not absolute in defining the two types of violence. Overall, the results of 
this study warrant additional research and testing of the joint commodity concept.  
 
Conclusion 
Overall, this study has highlighted the importance of legal arms transfers in the 





complex issue with many contributing sources and actors. While there are many dimensions to 
this phenomenon, the study of legal arms transfers can assist in developing solutions to address 
the problem. While weapons seizure data has value, it should not be used as the primary statistic 
when addressing arms trafficking. The issue should be studied from the point that a legal weapon 
is transferred, not at the point in which it becomes illicit. This can be done through the study of 
legal arms transactions, holdings, and transfers. In utilizing the joint commodity concept, 
research is not limited to small numbers of illicit arms data. Through the joint commodity model, 
arms transfers can truly be assessed in quantitative research. Further study can also be conducted 
with the joint commodity model to study other issues in conjunction with arms transfers. Legal 
arms transfers can also be used for further study of issues that were highlighted in this study, 
including non-state actor violence and violence against civilians. As noted in this study, there is a 
relationship between non-state actor violence and legal small arms and light weapons transfers. 
While there was not a relationship between legal arms transfers and attacks on civilians in this 
study, there are possibilities for further study of this concept with other regions and countries 
around the world. Additional violent behavior can also be studied in conjunction with legal arms 
transfers to determine a possible connection. In summary, this study indicates the versatility and 
applicability of using legal transfers for quantitative analysis. Overall, the key to understanding 
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